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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
~vs~

Case No. 14384

CURTIS GARFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-504, a felony of the third degree.
(R-38)

Defendant withdrew a plea of not guilty, and

entered a plea of guilty.

Defendants guilty plea

was accepted by the Trial Court as being intelligently,
voluntarily/and knowingly given, from which appellant
appeals.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Based upon the guilty plea which was intelligently,
voluntarily, and knowingly given, the lower court

entered its judgment that defendant be confined
for an indeterminate term of not more than five
years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower
court decisiono
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged with the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section
76-10-504, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, a
felony of the third degree.

The defendant withdrew

a plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty
which was accepted by the trial court as voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly given. (T-6-7).
As a result of plea bargaining the prosecutor
agreed only to make a recommendation of probation.
The prosecutor made the recommendation as he agreed
to do.(T-7,14,16)

However, the court made it

very clear to the appellant that any discussions
had between his attorney and the county attorney
did not affect what the trial judge might do with
regard to sentencing.

(T-5,6,7)

After the pre-sentence report was received
by the court, the appellant was sentenced to the
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The authorities cited by appellant, Santobello
Vo New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and United States
Vc Brown, 500 F.2d 374, 4th Cir. (4th Cir. 1974)
are only applicable if the prosecution has failed
to carry out its bargained for obligation.
In Santobello ye New York, supra, Mr.
Chief Justie Berger, writing for the majority
stated:
"This phase of the process of criminal
justice and the adjudicative element
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty,
must be attended by safeguards to insure
the defendant what is reasonably due in
the circumstances. Those circumstances
will vary, but a constant factor is that
when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilledc 404 U.S.
at 262."
In the instant case the promise to recommend
that the defendant be placed on probation was
carried out.

(T-7,13)

Respondent respectfully submits that the
record reflects very clearly that the appropriate
recommendation was made by the County Attorney,
and the appellant's rights were adequately safeguarded .

{
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY AND WITHOUT
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR WITHDRAWAL OF HIS PLEA.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in State v.
Lee Tim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825, (1932) adopted the
rule that it is within the sound discretion of the
trial court to allow or to refuse to allow a guilty
plea to be withdrawn.
The rule was later exemplified in State
v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963),

when

the court stated that:
"The writer sees no reason to review again the authorities on this subject except to remark that the sentence
in a criminal case is a final judgment
and one who would set aside such a final
order must proceed as the attacker and
has the burden of producing convincing
proof of a fact which consitutes a legal
ground for setting aside such sentence*
The presumption of validity is strong.
Id. at 671 and 672."
In the instant case, the appellant has not
rebutted the strong presumption of validity in
favor of the trial court's discretion.

The Supreme

Court of Nevada stated in Bates v. State, 436 P.2d
27, (Nev. 1968), that the withdrawal of a guilty plea
should be allowed only when good cause is shown.
at 31.

Id.

In the present case, appellant alleges that
the motion to withdraw the plea should have been
granted because the court sentenced the defendant
contrary to the recommendation of probation made
by the prosecutor.
To allow or refuse to allow defendant's
guilty plea to be withdrawn* is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and can only be disturbed by clear abuse«

The fact that an accused

pleads guilty with the hope that he will be granted
probation is insufficient to compel the withdrawal
of a guilty plea where probation is denied.

It is

clear from the record that the trial court did not
abuse its1 discretion.
POINT III
THE FACT THAT A GUILTY PLEA IS ENTERED WITH
THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING A MORE LENIENT SENTENCE
DOES NOT MAKE SUCH A PLEA AN INVOLUNTARY ONE.
In the present case, the trial court determined the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly given as reflected
by the record.(TR-2,3,4,5,6)

The record discloses

a sufficient factual basis for the trial courts
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acceptance of appellant's guilty plea.

The record

establishes that appellant was fully aware of the
consequences of his guilty plea.

(T-4)

The fact that a plea of guilty was entered
because of the possibility of obtaining a more
lenient sentence does not make such a plea an
involuntary one*

In Cortez v. United States, 337

F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964), the court held that:
"Most guilty pleas are the result
of a bargain with the prosecutor• But
this, standing alone, does not viliate
such pleas."
In the instant case, the trial court as
the trier of fact determined that appellant's guilty
plea was voluntarily given.

The trial court is in

the best position to view the facts and its determinations should only be disturbed if there is clear
abuse.
The Supreme Court of the United States
in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) set the
standard to be met for a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea.

It requires that a defendant should

be apprised of his rights against self-incrimination,
to trial by jury, and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.

It is clear from the trial record that

there was a complete waiver of these rights by the
appellant.(T-2,3,4,5,6,)

In Brady v, United States, 397 U.S. 742,
90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970), the court held that guilty
pleas are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently
and entered with counsel0

A guilty plea was

voluntarily made "while aware of the charges against
hinu"
In Brady v. United States, supra, the court
stated that a "plea of guilty entered by one fully
aware of direct consequences * . . must stand, unless
induced by threats or promises. . . e"

See also

Bates v. State, 84 Nev. 43, 436 P.2d 27 (1968).
In our case, appellant was given no promise
that he would receive probation, he could only be
assured that the prosecutor would make the recommendation.
Upon an examination of the record the trial court*s
decision to accept the plea should be affirmed.
Whether a guilty plea was coerced and
involuntary is ordinarily a question of fact, and
district court findings are not to be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous or without support
in the recordc

Gurule v. State, 461 F.2d 1083

(10th Circ 1972).
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POINT IV
THE COURT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ACT ON THE
RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR THAT THE
DEFENDANT, IN THIS CASE, BE PLACED ON PROBATION.
The defendant under point IV in his brief
states that the "defendant was mislead by the
prosecutor in believing his plea bargain would be
accepted by the court."

However, the court, as

contained in the transcript, makes it very clear
that he is not bound by any recommendation that the
prosecuting attorney might give.

(T-5,6,7)

Even

the defendant's counsel states that they were
aware that the recommendation of the prosecutor
would not and did not bind the judge with regard
to sentencing. (T-19)

The defendant was not mis-

lead.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953), states
in part:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if
it appears compatible with the public
interest, the court having jurisdiction
may suspend the imposition or the
execution of sentence and may place the
defendant on probation for such period
of time as the court shall determine.11
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The above statute makes it very clear that it is the
trial judge that has the discretion to impose probation on a defendant if he chooses, and the court
is not bound by any recommendation that might be
made by the prosecuting attorney or Adult Parole
and Probationc
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that from
the above it is clear that the trial court acted
properly in accepting appellant's guilty plea.
Furthermore, the interests of the appellant with
respect to the plea bargain were adequately protected « Therefore, respondent respectfully urges
that the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON Be ROI4NEY

A t t o r n e y Genera1
WILLIAM We BARRETT
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General

EARL F. DORUIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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